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EXECUTIVE ACTION IN THE FACE OF 
CONGRESSIONAL INACTION: EDUCATION WAIVERS 
CIRCUMVENTING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 27, 2010, President Barak Obama addressed 
members of Congress and the nation in his State of the Union 
speech regarding education reform. 
[W]e need to invest in the skills and education of our people. 
Now, this year, we’ve broken through the stalemate between 
left and right by launching a national competition to improve 
our schools. And the idea here is simple: Instead of rewarding 
failure, we only reward success. Instead of funding the status 
quo, we only invest in reform—reform that raises student 
achievement; inspires students to excel in math and science; 
and turns around failing schools that steal the future of too 
many young Americans . . . And in this country, the success of 
our children cannot depend more on where they live than on 
their potential. When we renew the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, we will work with Congress to 
expand these reforms to all 50 states.1 
Despite his optimistic intentions at the start of his 
presidency, President Obama has, so far, failed to fulfill his 
pledge to reform the No Child Left Behind Act, a bill passed 
under the Bush administration that was heavily criticized from 
both the political left and right. Although the Act was up for 
reauthorization in 2007, Congress has yet to pass any federal 
legislation under President Obama’s leadership, as partisan 
lines and lack of compromise have left Congress at a 
standstill.2 In response, the Obama administration’s Secretary 
 
 1  President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2010-
state-union-address#transcript. 
 2  See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6302 (2006); see also Cyn-
thia G. Brown & Jeremy Ayers, Education Waivers 101: Eight Questions You Should 
Ask About Education Waivers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/news/2011/09/23/10295-/education-
waivers-101/ (stating that NCLB has been operating on “auto-pilot” since 2007). 
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of Education, Arne Duncan, has issued conditional waivers to 
school districts, exempting them from NCLB requirements only 
if a school district agrees to implement the Obama 
administration’s educational policy.3 Instead of a 
comprehensive law that respects the legislative process and our 
constitutional foundation, the overreach of the executive 
branch is shaping our education reform. 
Part II of this paper will critique the divided political 
climate and education policy stalemate in Congress that 
currently exists, preventing the passage of federal education 
policy legislation. Part III will discuss the constitutional 
framework and statutory provisions that govern executive 
action in education. Part IV will evaluate President Obama’s 
current actions in issuing waivers to various school districts, 
circumventing the legislative process, and Congress’ 
subsequent reaction to such executive action. Part V will then 
balance constitutional concerns with practical interests. 
II. EDUCATION POLICY STALEMATE IN CONGRESS 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”), a 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, was enacted by the 107th Congress and signed into law by 
President George W. Bush on January 8, 2002, in an effort “to 
close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and 
choice, so that no child is left behind.”4 As a priority on 
President Bush’s legislative agenda, NCLB was intended to 
increase student achievement and hold states more 
accountable for student progress, focusing primarily on 
minority students.5 Specifically, NCLB required states to 
administer annual tests for grades three through eight in 
reading and mathematics in which students were to score 
 
 3  Memorandum from Emily Barbour et al., Cong. Research Serv., to House 
Committee on Education and the Workforce, Sec’y of Educ.’s Waiver Auth. with Re-
spect to Title I-A Provisions Included in the Elementary and Secondary Educ. Act 4 
(2011). 
 4  107 P.L. 110; 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 
(2006)) (reiterating that the purpose of the Act is “to ensure that all children have a 
fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at 
a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and 
state academic assessments.”). 
 5  No Child Left Behind, EDUC. WEEK, http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/no-
child-left-behind/ (last updated Sept. 19, 2011). 
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“proficient” by the 2013–2014 school year.6 States were also 
required to track the progress of the student population as a 
whole, in addition to the progress of individual demographic 
groups, ensuring “adequate yearly progress.”7 NCLB received 
substantial bipartisan support in Congress, with both 
Democrats and Republicans advocating for increased school 
district accountability for the education of America’s poor and 
minority children.8 
Although NCLB received widespread support initially, it 
became the subject of harsh criticism from both the political 
left and right once it was implemented.9 Once championed as 
legislation that would provide opportunity and advance the 
education of poor and minority students, NCLB was now being 
criticized for its “obsessive focus on test results.”10 Diane 
Ravitch, Research Professor of Education at New York 
 
 6  20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941; see also No Child Left Behind, supra note 5 (“If a 
school receiving federal Title I funding failed to meet the target two years in a row, it 
would be provided technical assistance and its students would be offered a choice of 
other public schools to attend. Students in schools that failed to make adequate pro-
gress three years in a row also were offered supplemental educational services, includ-
ing private tutoring. For continued failures, a school would be subject to outside correc-
tive measures, including possible governance changes.”); No Child Left Behind Act, 
N.Y. TIMES (last updated July 6, 2012), http://archive.is/uQsV# (“Schools that fail to 
make the required annual progress, whether overall or for subgroups, face a mounting 
scale of sanctions, from being required to provide tutoring to students in poor-
performing schools to the threat of state takeovers or the shutting down of individual 
schools.”). 
 7  No Child Left Behind, supra note 5; see also No Child Left Behind Act, supra 
note 6. 
 8  See Jack Kenny, Education Waivers Highlight Obama’s Executive Agenda, 
NEW AM. (July 7, 2012, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/education/item/11991-education-waivers-
highlight-obamas-executive-agenda (stating that “[t]he goal of holding schools and 
school districts responsible for the education of poor and minority students generated 
widespread, bipartisan support for the No Child Left Behind Act. . .”); see also Ben 
Feller & Kimberly Hefling, Official: 10 States Given Waiver on No Child Left Behind 
Learning Laws, NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 9, 2012, 7:02 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/46323704/ns/politics/t/official-states-given-waiver-no-child-
left-behind-learning-laws/#.URCsZ1qLwVk (reiterating that “No Child Left Behind 
was primarily designed to help the nation’s poor and minority children and was passed 
a decade ago with widespread bipartisan support.”). 
 9  Kenny, supra note 8 (also citing that conservatives opposed the program “as 
an unconstitutional imposition of federal authority over local and state education poli-
cies, while liberals have complained of underfunding.”). 
 10  No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6; see also CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, 
STATE HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS: TRENDS IN TEST PROGRAMS, ALTERNATE PATHWAYS, 
AND PASS RATES 1 (2009), available at http://www.cep-
dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=326 (“Changes in exit exam policies over the 
past eight years reflect states’ struggles to develop standards and testing systems that 
are sufficiently demanding but also achievable and fair.”). 
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University, explained that “[t]he problem with using tests to 
make important decisions about people’s lives is that 
standardized tests are not precise instruments.”11 Testing 
experts contend that test scores should be one part of a broader 
assessment of student achievement, including final grades, 
class participation, homework scores, and teacher assessments; 
yet NCLB does not allow this comprehensive evaluation.12 
Critics argue that because standardized testing and adequate 
yearly progress are required for a school district to avoid 
sanctions, the law’s rating system does not set practical goals 
for schools to meet.13 During the 2010–2011 school year, almost 
half of all public schools in the country failed to meet the 
educational goals based on the NCLB rating system.14 Further, 
opponents contend that NCLB has not improved the education 
of students. The National Assessment of Educational Progress 
math test results for 2009 show faster growth in student 
achievement in the years before NCLB when states were in full 
control of their education systems.15 
 
 11  DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL 
SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 152 (2010); see also 
Rosemary C. Salomone, The Common School Before and After Brown: Democracy, 
Equality, and the Productivity Agenda, 120 YALE L. J. 1454, 1480 (2011).  
 12  RAVITCH, supra note 11; see also Meteor Blades, Jim Cummins Demolishes 
NCLB’s Ideology and Practice, DAILY KOS (July 26, 2007, 11:49 AM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/7/26/131722/394 (quoting Jim Cummins in a 
speech before the California Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages Asso-
ciation on July 25, 2007, stating that NCLB “standardized tests dominate curriculum 
and instruction; first language literacy is discouraged and undervalued.”). 
 13  No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6; see also Kenny, supra note 8; Sam 
Dillon, Obama To Seek Sweeping Change in “No Child” Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, 
at A1 (“The education law has been praised for focusing attention on achievement gaps, 
but it has also generated tremendous opposition, especially from educators, who con-
tend that it sets impossible goals for students and schools and humiliates students and 
educators when they fall short.”), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/education/01child.html?pagewanted=all; but see 
WORKING GRP. ON ELL POLICY, IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE LEARNERS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 6–7 (Mar. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.cal.org/topics/ell/ELL-Working-Group-ESEA.pdf (“NCLB has fostered 
greater inclusion of ELLs [English Language Learners] in standards-based instruction, 
assessment, and accountability than did prior authorizations of ESEA. By holding 
schools and districts accountable for the performance of ELLs in acquiring proficiency 
in English and in meeting grade-level performance standards for content area 
achievement, the law has brought attention to both the language and academic content 
needs of ELLs. With this attention have come positive actions and improved outcomes 
for this traditionally underserved group.”). 
 14  Kenny, supra note 8 (noting that in Virginia, 61% of schools were failing to 
meet their educational goals, and a startling 80 percent were failing in Massachusetts). 
 15  Sam Dillon, Sluggish Results Seen in Math Scores, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, 
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Yet even more troubling than schools failing to meet 
educational goals are the numerous cheating scandals that 
have been exposed since the passage of NCLB.16 In 2011, USA 
Today identified 1,610 examples of “anomalies in which public 
school classes—a school’s entire fifth grade, for example—
boasted what analysts regard as statistically rare, perhaps 
suspect, gains on state tests.”17 The most infamous of these 
cheating scandals occurred in the Atlanta public school district. 
On March 29, 2013, the Fulton County Grand Jury issued 
indictments of Atlanta Public School Superintendent Beverly 
Hall and 34 other educational professionals for conspiring to 
“‘either cheat, conceal cheating or retaliate against 
whistleblowers’ in order to boost the school district’s scores on 
Georgia’s Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests (CRCT).”18 
Opponents of NCLB, including Verdaillia Turner, president of 
the Georgia Federation of Teachers, blame the law for these 
cheating scandals, claiming that when there is “high-stakes 
testing, which are one-shot deals” as with NCLB, it is “unfair to 
children, [and] unfair to educators.”19 With similar cheating 
schemes identified in Texas20 and California,21 critics of NCLB 
 
at A18 (“Scores increased only marginally for eighth graders and not at all for fourth 
graders, continuing a sluggish six-year trend of slowing achievement growth since pas-
sage of the law.”) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15-
/education/15math.html; see also JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: 
ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN 
AMERICA 10–11 (2010) (noting that by allowing states to decide the difficulty of their 
tests, NCLB creates a perverse incentive for states to “dumb down” their academic and 
proficiency standards, converting a “race to the top” to a “race to the bottom.”). 
 16  Motoko Rich, ‘No Child’ Law Whittled Down by White House, N.Y. TIMES, Ju-
ly 6, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com-/2012/07/06/education/no-child-
left-behind-whittled-down-under-obama.html (faulting NCLB’s focus on test results as 
leading to “some notorious cheating scandals.”). 
 17  Greg Toppo, et al., When Test Scores Seem Too Good to Believe, USA TODAY, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.-com/news/education/2011-03-06-school-testing_N.htm (last 
updated Mar. 17, 2011, 12:44 PM) (The USA Today investigation included three to sev-
en years of test scores from Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Washington, D.C.). 
 18  Ned Resnikoff, Atlanta Cheating Scandal Puts National Education Policy on 
Trial, NBCNEWS.COM (Apr. 1, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/04/01/atlanta-
cheating-scandal-puts-national-education-policy-on-trial (NCLB critics “argue that the 
Atlanta cheating scandal is not an isolated incident of criminal activity.”). 
 19  Id. (quoting Interview by MSNBC with Verdaillia Turner, President, Georgia 
Federation of Teachers, (Apr. 1, 2013)) (noting that there was increased pressure in 
Georgia to obtain NCLB federal funds since the state cut education spending per stu-
dent by 14.8% since 2008). 
 20  Claudio Sanchez, El Paso Schools Cheating Scandal: Who’s Accountable?, 
NPR (Apr. 10, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/04/10/176784631/el-paso-
schools-cheating-scandal-probes-officials-accountability (noting that Lorenzo Garcia 
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have increasing evidence that the law fails to serve its purpose 
of improving the education of poor and minority students. 
Despite the overwhelming criticism of NCLB, little action 
has been taken by Congress to rectify its weaknesses. In 2007, 
the act was up for reauthorization, with President Bush 
supporting the continuation of the law, stating that one of his 
“top priorities . . . will be the reauthorization and the 
strengthening of the No Child Left Behind Act.”22 The Bush 
administration intended to improve the law by proposing 
funding for a new program to bring math and science 
professionals into the classroom, providing parents of children 
in struggling schools with information of transfer options, and 
setting higher standards of high school achievement. Further, a 
$1.5 billion initiative to fund more testing and a program to 
train over 70,000 new teachers in Advance Placement courses 
was established.23 However, President Bush was unable to 
persuade Congress to undertake the reauthorization of NCLB 
during the last year of his presidency, as disagreements over 
the role of the federal government in education and harsh 
criticisms of the Act resulted in a partisan standstill.24 
In March 2010, President Obama released his proposal to 
reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
entitled “A Blueprint for Reform.”25 His blueprint was “not only 
 
was the first superintendent convicted of “fraud and reporting bogus test scores for fi-
nancial gain” after changing test scores and forcing academically struggling students to 
drop out of Bowie High School while collecting more than $56,000 in bonuses). 
 21  Howard Blume, State Strips 23 Schools of API Rankings for Cheating, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/28/local/la-me-tests-cheating-
20121029 (citing 23 schools that were stripped of a key state ranking by state officials 
for “cheating, other misconduct or mistakes in administering the standardized tests 
given last spring.”). 
 22  See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, President Bush 
Discusses No Child Left Behind (Oct. 5, 2006) available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061005-6.html (President Bush ad-
dressing Woodridge Elementary and Middle Campus in Washington, D.C.). 
 23  See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The No 
Child Left Behind Act: Challenging Students Through High Expectations (Oct. 5, 
2006), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061005-
2.html (specifying other Bush proposals to improve NCLB, including a scholarship pro-
gram to allow 28,000 low income children to transfer to a private or religious school of 
their choice). 
 24  See Associated Press, Education Department Allows States to Get Waivers on 
No Child Tests, FOX NEWS (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/09/education-department-allows-states-to-get-
waivers-on-no-child-tests/?test=latestnews; see also Feller & Hefling, supra note 8. 
 25  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF 
THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT (2010), available at 
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a plan to renovate a flawed law, but also an outline for a re-
envisioned federal role in education,”26 focusing on 
(1) Improving teacher quality and principal effectiveness to 
ensure that every classroom has a great teacher and every 
school has a great leader; (2) Providing information to fami-
lies to help them evaluate and improve their children’s 
schools, and to educators to help them improve their students’ 
learning; (3) Implementing college- and career-ready stand-
ards and developing improved assessments aligned with those 
standards; and (4) Improving student learning and achieve-
ment in America’s lowest-performing schools by providing in-
tensive support and effective interventions.27 
President Obama’s Blueprint for Reform attempted to 
correct NCLB’s overemphasis on testing by eliminating the 
school rating system based on students’ test scores and “annual 
yearly progress,” and extending the 2014 proficiency deadline 
to 2020.28 While the Blueprint restates a commitment to meet 
the needs of poor and minority students, including English 
language learners and students with disabilities, it proposes no 
details or strategies for school districts to implement.29 
President Obama’s Blueprint for Reform changed some 
evident weaknesses in President Bush’s No Child Left Behind 
Act; however, the proposed blueprint still faced opposition in 
Congress and has yet to become law.30 Some education scholars 
 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint.pdf; see also Education Depart-
ment Allows States to Get Waivers on No Child Tests, supra note 24 (emphasizing that 
President Obama waited a year into his presidency before proposing his changes to the 
education policy). 
 26  Id. at 2. 
 27  Id.; see also No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6 (identifying A Blueprint 
for Reform as “a sweeping overhaul of the law in March 2010 that would encourage 
states to raise academic standards, end the identification of tens of thousands of rea-
sonably managed schools as failing and refocus energies on turning around the few 
thousand schools that are in the worst shape.”). 
 28  A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 25, at 9–10; see also Salomone, supra 
note 11, at 1479. 
 29  Salomone, supra note 11, at 1479 (noting that the Blueprint reiterates the 
Obama administration’s 2009 “Race to the Top” initiative which “placed states in com-
petition . . . for $4.35 billion in education stimulus funds allocated for fiscal year 2010” 
by inducing school districts “to create data-driven systems for training and evaluating 
teachers and principals, encourage the establishment of high-quality charter schools, 
develop plans for turning around failing schools, demonstrate statewide political con-
sensus for proposed reforms, and adopt the national education standards” in order to 
qualify).  
 30  No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6 (noting that “teachers’ unions and 
some Republican lawmakers immediately signaled their dislike for pieces of the plan, 
complicating the administration’s job as Congress takes up the task of reworking the 
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argued that the Blueprint failed to provide any specifics on how 
to implement the changes, stating “[i]t might be easy to 
overstate the significance of the Blueprint; it is an extremely 
vague forty-one page document that neither resembles a 
statute nor resolves many of the particularities that an 
eventual statute in this realm will.”31 Without specific 
instructions on how to implement the changes to the law, or 
detailed changes to NCLB in general, the Blueprint has proven 
to be nothing more than a theoretical idea, with no chance of 
actual execution. 
Moreover, partisanship in Congress has prevented the 
passage of a sweeping federal policy in education reform. Those 
on the left attribute the lack of education policy legislation to 
the “highly partisan bills” proposed by Republicans “that would 
scale back federal accountability for low-performing schools 
and students, and even limit accountability for how states and 
districts use taxpayer funds.”32 The Republican-majority House 
Committee on Education and the Workforce, led by 
Representative John Kline (R) from Minnesota, has proposed 
three bills focusing on more specific areas of education;33 yet 
these bills have never made it to the House floor for debate or 
vote.34 Another bill, proposed by Senator Tom Harkin (D) of 
Iowa, Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee, supported “state-designed accountability 
systems” and “flexibility for innovation on the local level,” 
restoring power to the states to set “college and career ready 
academic standards.”35 Yet Secretary of Education Arne 
 
No Child law” and that “even if lawmakers were to adopt the plan in its broad outlines, 
experts said, years of work would be required to roll out the new federal policies to 
states and in the nation’s 15,000 school districts.”). 
 31  Sandy Kress, Stephanie Zechmann, & J. Matthew Schmitten, Symposium, 
Education Reform: When Performance Matters: The Past, Present, and Future of Conse-
quential Accountability in Public Education, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 185, 228 (2011). 
 32  Brown & Ayers, supra note 2 (defending President Obama’s issuance of waiv-
ers to school districts, stating “[w]ith little prospect for bipartisan cooperation in sight, 
the Obama administration is wise to take action to ensure states, districts, and schools 
move forward in education reform.”). 
 33  Sally Holland, White House Announces Waivers for No Child Left Behind 
Law, CNN.COM, Aug. 9, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/08/08/no.child.waivers-/index.html (specifying 
that these bills were “intended to streamline education programs, address charter 
school issues and give states and localities more flexibility in spending their federal 
dollars” and that only the charter school bill had bipartisan support). 
 34  Id. 
 35  U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, HELP 
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Duncan argued that the Harkin-Enzi bill “compromises too 
much, particularly on teacher evaluations and student-
achievement goals.”36 Further, minority student advocates 
criticize the bill’s elimination of central, federal accountability, 
claiming that the bill “would represent ‘a significant step 
backward,’ returning the nation to the years before [NCLB’s] 
passage, when many states did a slipshod job of promoting 
student achievement.”37 
More recently, on June 6, 2013, Representative John Kline 
(R) introduced another reauthorization of ESEA to the House 
floor, H.R. 5: Student Success Act.38 On July 19, 2013, the 
House of Representatives voted to pass the Student Success 
Act with a vote of 221–207.39 According to Rep. Kline, the 
Student Success Act “eliminates the one-size-fits-all 
Adequately Yearly Progress (AYP) metric and returns 
authority for measuring student achievement to states and 
school districts” while encouraging states and districts “to 
develop teacher evaluations systems that better gauge an 
educator’s influence on student learning.”40 Further, the 
Student Success Act grants “maximum flexibility to develop 
effective school improvement strategies for underperforming 
schools.”41 While the passage of this bill in the House suggests 
advancement towards a comprehensive federal education 
policy, it is highly unlikely that the Student Success Act will 
pass in the Senate. For one, the bill is co-sponsored by twelve 
 
Committee Approves Bipartisan Bill to Fix No Child Left Behind (Oct. 20, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press-/release/?id=9b968366-140f-4b60-
a568-2f6efa48877c&groups=Chair (noting that the “bipartisan Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Reauthorization Act passed out of committee by a bipartisan vote of 
15 to 7”); see also Dillon, supra note 13. 
 36  Sam Dillon, Senate Panel Approves Bill That Rewrites Education Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A9; see also Holland, supra note 33 (quoting Secretary Duncan: 
“The law—No Child Left Behind—as it currently stands is four years overdue for being 
rewritten. It is far too punitive, it is far too prescriptive, lead to a dummying down of 
standards, lead to a narrowing of the curriculum . . . We can’t afford to have the law of 
the land be one that has so many perverse incentives or disincentives to the kind of 
progress that we want to see.”).  
 37  Sam Dillon, Bill Would Overhaul No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
2011, at A9. 
 38  H.R. 5: Student Success Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5 (last updated July 24, 2013). 
 39  Final Vote Results for Roll Call 374, HOUSE.GOV, 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll374.xml  (last visited March 13, 2014). 
 40 Education, U.S. CONGRESSMAN JOHN KLINE, 
http://kline.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=109065 (last visited March 13, 2014). 
 41  Id. 
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Republicans and passed in the House by a narrow margin 
without a single Democratic vote.42 To pass in the Democrat-
controlled Senate, the bill would need to have bipartisan 
support; however, that this would occur is doubtful. Critics 
from the political left claim the bill “does nothing to ensure 
that state standards are rigorous enough to make sure 
students graduate from school college and career ready”43 and 
“neglects to close a well-known federal loophole that allows 
districts to allocate fewer dollars to high-poverty schools 
compared to more affluent schools.”44 The National Education 
Association claims the Student Success Act “erodes the 
historical federal role in public education: targeting resources 
to marginalized student populations as a means of helping to 
ensure equity of opportunity for all students.”45 While one can 
hope that bipartisan compromise could save this bill in the 
Senate, failed legislative attempts in the past of reauthorizing 
the ESEA suggest that the Student Success Act will not become 
federal law, leaving NCLB to continue to run on “auto-pilot” as 
it has been since 2007.46 
This political climate, and the stalemate in Congress, has 
brought about President Obama’s practice of issuing 
conditional waivers of NCLB provisions to school districts. As 
Secretary Duncan said when he released waivers to districts in 
Washington and Wisconsin, “A strong, bipartisan 
reauthorization of the ESEA remains the best path forward in 
education reform, but as 26 states have now demonstrated, our 
 
 42  Final Vote Results for Roll Call 374, HOUSE.GOV, 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll374.xml  (last visited March 13, 2014); see also 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/113-2013/h374. 
 43  Melissa Lazarín, The Student Success Act Is the Wrong Way Forward, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/news/2013/07/18/70033/the-student-
success-act-is-the-wrong-way-forward/ (arguing that “in pursuit of flexibility and in-
creased local control, the House Republican bill limits federal oversight in ways that 
can actually undermine educational opportunities for students.”). 
 44  Id. (“Federal Title I dollars are intended to narrow the funding gap between 
high- and low-poverty schools . . . but the ability of federal Title I dollars to equalize 
school funding is undermined by a common practice that allows districts to use average 
teacher-salary figures and teacher-student rations in their school budget allocations, 
masking inequities.”). 
 45  No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)-ESEA, NATIONAL EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nea.org/home/-NoChildLeftBehindAct.html (last visited 
March 14, 2014). 
 46  Brown & Ayers, supra note 2; see also Education Department Allows States to 
Get Waivers on No Child Tests, supra note 24 (noting that “Duncan has warned that 82 
percent of U.S. schools could be labeled failures next year if the law is not changed.”).  
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kids can’t wait any longer for Congress to act.”47 With a lack of 
cohesion and partisan lines preventing a comprehensive federal 
education policy from being passed in Congress, one could 
argue that waivers are the only option available to the Obama 
administration to implement change. However, where 
conditional waivers bypass the legislative process fundamental 
to our Constitution, one must also be cautious of the legal basis 
for such executive action. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS 
When discussing the constitutionality of President Obama’s 
actions with regard to unilaterally issuing waivers to school 
districts, it is critical to examine the executive and 
congressional functions outlined in the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court has ruled that, “the President’s power, if any, 
to issue an [executive] order must stem either from an act of 
Congress or from the Constitution itself.”48 Article II, Section I 
of the Constitution states, “[t]he executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America.”49 Article 
II, Section III further establishes that the President shall “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”50 These provisions 
are the primary justifications for unilateral action by the 
executive. Conversely, Article I, Section I provides that, “All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House 
of Representatives.”51 Article I, Section 8 further empowers 
Congress “to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper.”52 These constitutional underpinnings are at the heart 
of the current debate over education policy, as Congress argues 
that President Obama’s actions of issuing waivers to school 
districts infringes on its Article I power to legislate. As 
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham iterates, the President is 
“using executive orders as a political tool—‘I can’t work with 
 
 47  Kenny, supra note 8; see also Holland, supra note 33 (quoting Secretary Dun-
can: “We hope that this is simply a transition or bridge to fixing the law.”). 
 48  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
 49  U.S. CONST. art. II, § I. 
 50  U.S. CONST. art. II, § III. 
 51  U.S. CONST. art. I, § I. 
 52  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Congress so I’m going to do it myself.”53 Such action violates 
the separation of powers doctrine. 
Provisions under the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (ESEA), as reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, provide a statutory framework to examine executive 
authority to issue waivers relieving school districts of NCLB 
requirements. In the ESEA, Congress delegated certain powers 
to the Secretary of Education, one of the fifteen heads of 
executive departments through which the President has the 
ability to act.54 Section 9401 of the ESEA establishes that “the 
Secretary [of Education] may waive any statutory or regulatory 
requirement of this Act . . . for a State educational agency, local 
educational agency, Indian tribe, or school through a local 
educational agency, that (1) receives funds under a program 
authorized by this Act . . . and (2) requests a waiver under 
subsection (b).”55 It is worthy to note that the text of the 
statute, both plain and unambiguous, grants the Secretary 
broad, discretionary power to waive any requirement of 
NCLB.56 Section 9401(c) of the ESEA does provide for 
restrictions on the Secretary’s waiver authority; these 
restrictions, however, do not relate to testing requirements, 
which are the most commonly requested waivers by school 
districts.57 
 
 53  Laura Meckler, Obama Shifts View of Executive Power, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 20, 
2012, 12:31 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303812904577292273665694712.html 
(noting that Senator Graham “generally supports Mr. Obama’s executive actions in na-
tional security but not on domestic affairs.”).  
 54  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President appoints his 
cabinet with the advice and consent of the Senate). 
 55  20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2011); see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 56  See BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–2, 4 (noting that the Secretary’s dis-
cretionary authority was affirmed when a federal court rejected a state’s challenge to a 
denial of its waiver request in State of Connecticut v. Spellings); see also State of Con-
necticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 495 (D. Conn. 2006) (stating that “the lan-
guage of the provision governing waivers grants the Secretary broad discretion to deny 
states’ waiver requests”), aff’d on other grounds, Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1471 (2011); see, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 
Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
 57  20 U.S.C. § 7861(c) (2011). “The Secretary shall not waive under this section 
any statutory or regulatory requirements relating to (1) the allocation or distribution of 
funds to States, local educational agencies, or other recipients of funds under this Act 
[20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq.]; (2) maintenance of effort; (3) comparability of services; (4) 
use of Federal funds to supplement, not supplant, non-Federal funds; (5) equitable par-
ticipation of private school students and teachers; (6) parental participation and in-
volvement; (7) applicable civil rights requirements; (8) the requirement for a charter 
school under subpart 1 of part B of title V [20 USCS §§ 7221 et seq.]; (9) the prohibi-
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ESEA section 9401(b) establishes the specific process by 
which a state educational agency, local educational agency, or 
Indian tribe can request waivers. The waiver request 
submitted to the Secretary of Education must meet, at a 
minimum, the following requirements: the waiver must (1) 
identify the Federal programs that will be affected by the 
waiver, (2) include a description of how the Federal statutory 
or regulatory requirements are to be waived and how waiving 
the requirements will improve the quality of instruction and 
academic achievement of students, (3) describe measurable 
educational goals for each school year and methods to measure 
annual progress, (4) explain how the waiver will help achieve 
these annual goals, and (5) make clear how the schools will 
continue to assist the same population of students served by 
the Federal programs for which waivers have been requested.58 
Waivers granted by the Secretary under Section 9401 may not 
be extended for longer than four years; the Secretary, however, 
“may extend the period . . . if the Secretary determines that (A) 
the waiver has been effective in enabling the State or affected 
recipient to carry out the activities for which the waiver was 
requested and the waiver has contributed to improved student 
achievement; and (B) the extension is in the public interest.”59 
Conversely, if “the Secretary determines, after notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing, that the performance of the State or 
other recipient affected by the waiver has been inadequate to 
justify a continuation of the waiver or if the waiver is no longer 
necessary to achieve its original purposes,” the Secretary shall 
terminate the waiver.60 
Lastly, Section 9401(g) of the ESEA requires the Secretary 
to publish “notice of the Secretary’s decision to grant each 
waiver” in the Federal Register and to “provide for the 
 
tions regarding (A) State aid in section 9522 [20 U.S.C. § 7902]; (B) use of funds for re-
ligious worship or instruction in section 9505 [20 U.S.C. § 7885]; and (C) activities in 
section 9526 [20 U.S.C. § 7906]; or (10) the selection of a school attendance area or 
school under subsections (a) and (b) of section 1113 [20 U.S.C. § 6313], except that the 
Secretary may grant a waiver to allow a school attendance area or school to participate 
in activities under part A of title I if the percentage of children from low-income fami-
lies in the school attendance area or who attend the school is not more than 10 per-
centage points below the lowest percentage of those children for any school attendance 
area or school of the local educational agency that meets the requirements of subsec-
tions (a) and (b) of section 1113 [20 U.S.C. § 6313].” 
 58  20 U.S.C. § 7861(b)(1) (2011). 
 59  20 U.S.C. § 7861(d) (2011). 
 60  20 U.S.C. § 7861(f) (2011). 
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dissemination of the notice to State educational agencies, 
interested parties, including educators, parents, students, 
advocacy and civil rights organizations, and the public.”61 
Further, the Secretary of Education must submit annual 
reports to Congress detailing the effectiveness of granted 
waivers.62 
The Secretary does not have the explicit authority, under 
Section 9401, to impose new conditions on school districts; yet, 
the Secretary may be able to enact new education policies by 
implicitly or explicitly conditioning the waiver’s approval on 
the school district acquiescing to new conditions.63 While 
technically these conditions would not be required, as the 
school district’s compliance would be voluntary and a separate 
waiver request for an unconditional waiver could be 
submitted,64 the Secretary would nonetheless be able to impose 
the executive branch’s education policy without the 
involvement or consent of Congress.65 Those opposed to 
waivers, including Republicans in Congress and conservative 
think tanks, argue that the Secretary’s act of placing conditions 
on waivers is beyond the constitutional power of the 
executive.66 As Senator Marco Rubio (R) from Florida expressed 
in a letter to Secretary Duncan regarding the President’s 
authority to issue waivers to school districts, “[o]ur principal 
concern is that the Executive branch does not possess the 
authority to force states into compliance with administration-
backed reforms instituted through the issuance of waivers. . . . 
 
 61  20 U.S.C. § 7861(g) (2011). 
 62  See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION’S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON WAIVERS GRANTED UNDER SECTION 9401 OF THE 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 2009 (Dec. 
2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/freedom/-
local/flexibility/waiverletters/2010waiverreport.pdf; see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 6–7. 
 63  BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 6–7. 
 64  Id. (arguing that “a reviewing court could deem the conditional waiver to be 
arbitrary and capricious or in excess of the agency’s statutory authority.”). 
 65  Kenny, supra note 8 (highlighting that the “profusion of waivers has raised 
the question of whether the Obama administration is using the procedure to bypass 
Congress in the legislative promise . . .”). 
 66  Meckler, supra note 53 (quoting Senator Graham, saying that the President 
is “using executive orders as a political tool—‘I can’t work with Congress so I’m going to 
do it myself’”); see also Lindsey M. Burke, Issue Brief: No Child Left Behind Waivers: 
Bogus Relief, Genuine Overreach, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws-.com/2012/pdf/ib3718.pdf (“[T]he waivers are part of a 
long line of executive overreach that is not limited to education, compounding a pattern 
of disregard for the normal legislative process.”).  
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This initiative is an overstep of authority that undermines 
existing law, and violates the constitutional separation of 
powers.”67 Those in favor of the Secretary granting waivers, 
including Democrats in Congress and liberal political 
organizations, counter by arguing that Section 9401 does not 
expressly forbid voluntary conditions on waivers and that this 
has been common practice.68 Despite these concerns, a legal 
challenge to the Secretary’s broad and extensive waiver 
authority in federal court has yet to surface.69 
IV. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S CURRENT ACTIONS AND CONGRESS’ 
REACTION 
With an education legislation standstill in Congress, the 
Obama administration’s Secretary of Education Arne Duncan 
has issued conditional waivers to school districts, releasing 
them of certain NCLB requirements. With these waivers, the 
Obama administration executed its own education policy 
agenda, conditioning waiver approval on the school district 
agreeing to certain provisions, thereby circumventing Congress’ 
involvement in policy making.70 As required by Section 9401 of 
the ESEA, the Department of Education publishes an annual 
count on all waivers granted.71 During the 2009 calendar year, 
 
 67  Letter from Sen. Marco Rubio to the Honorable Arne Duncan, Secretary of 
Education (Sept. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=7c1cf499-4bfc-4db0-
8a5b-5e3cc5291560. 
 68  Brown & Ayers, supra note 2; see also U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Ed-
ucation, Labor, & Pensions, Harkin Statement on President’s Announcement of NCLB 
Waivers (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=d55d4e9b-f6ab-4db3-89ab-
f09fe948d483 (quoting Senator Harkin: “House Republicans seem committed to push-
ing forward partisan legislation that will move our schools backwards . . . . In the face 
of the House Republicans’ refusal to work across the aisle, President Obama has shown 
great leadership in taking this step to relieve some states from some of the most bur-
densome requirements of NCLB while ensuring that those states commit to a modern-
ized accountability system that maintains a focus on student success.”). 
 69  BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3 (stating that “[T]here are no federal court cases 
that provide guidance regarding the scope of the Secretary’s waiver authority.”). 
 70  See No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6 (“In exchange for the education 
waivers, schools and districts must promise to set new targets aimed at preparing stu-
dents for colleges and careers. They must also tether evaluations of teachers and 
schools in part to student achievement on standardized tests. The use of tests to judge 
teacher effectiveness is a departure from No Child Left Behind, which used test scores 
to rate schools and districts.”); see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3. 
 71  20 U.S.C. § 7861(g) (2011). 
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Secretary Duncan issued 351 waivers.72 While few waivers 
allowed state educational agencies to approve new schools or 
provide supplemental educational services,73 the majority of the 
waivers granted to school districts directly pertained to the 
ESEA growth models or differentiated accountability 
measures.74 During the 2010 calendar year, a total of 238 
waivers were granted by the Department of Education under 
its waiver authority granted by the ESEA, with many allowing 
the state educational agency to redefine the “regulatory 
definition of ‘persistently lowest-achieving schools.’”75 
While recent statistics on the issuance of waivers have yet 
to be reported in the Federal Register for the 2011, 2012 and 
2013 calendar years, it is likely that the Obama administration 
plans to continue on its path of unilateral executive action in 
education. In September of 2011, President Obama clearly 
expressed his intent to relieve failing school districts of strict 
NCLB standards and put Congress on notice, stating “Congress 
hasn’t been able to do it, so I will . . . Starting today, we’ll be 
giving states more flexibility to meet high standards.”76 At the 
 
 72  U.S. Department of Education, “Notice of Waivers Granted Under Section 
9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended,” 75 Feder-
al Register 56834-01 (Sept. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/other/2010-3/091610c.html; but see U.S. 
Department of Education, “Notice of Waivers Granted Under Section 9401 of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended,” 74 Federal Register 
22909–01 (May 15, 2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister-
/other/2010-3/091610c.html (reporting that during the 2008 calendar year the Depart-
ment of Education granted a total of 51 waivers under Section 9401, signifying nearly a 
600% increase in waivers issued in 2009); BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 3–4 (“[O]ver 
half of the waivers granted (196 waivers) were provided to LEAs and schools with re-
spect to the treatment of their Title I-A funds granted under the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) when calculating the amount of Title I-A 
funds that were required to be used to provide public school choice and supplemental 
educational services (SES) and when calculating their per-pupil amount for SES, as 
well as to waive a carryover limitation for Title I-A funds more than once every three 
years.”). 
 73  BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 74  Id. at 3–4; see also 34 CFR 200.20 (detailing specific requirements regarding 
growth models). 
 75  U.S. Department of Education, “Notice of Waivers Granted Under Section 
9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended; Notice,” 78 
Federal Register 71410 (November 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-27/html/2013-28504.htm.  
 76  President Barack Obama, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Re-
marks by the President on No Child Left Behind Flexibility (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/23/remarks-president-no-child-left-
behind-flexibility (“[T]hese problems have been obvious to parents and educators all 
over the country for years now. Despite the good intentions of some . . . Congress has 
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start of the 2011–2012 school year, Secretary Arne Duncan 
announced that he would “‘unilaterally’ grant waivers from the 
100% proficiency requirement for states that have adopted 
acceptable accountability programs and are ‘making other 
strides toward’ school improvement” because Congress has 
“failed thus far to act on reauthorization.”77 
The Obama administration stayed true to its position on 
waivers during the 2012 year. On February 9, 2012, the 
administration issued waivers to ten states, relieving them of 
the student proficiency requirement in reading and math by 
2014 “in exchange for embracing the administration’s 
educational agenda and its focus on accountability and teacher 
effectiveness.”78 On May 29, 2012, eight more states were 
granted waivers regarding the proficiency requirement,79 with 
five more states joining the ranks on June 29, 2012, by 
agreeing “to enact new standards and evaluate schools and 
teachers based on students’ academic progress.”80 The 
 
not been able to fix these flaws so far. I’ve urged Congress for a while now, let’s get a 
bipartisan effort, let’s fix this. Congress hasn’t been able to do it. So I will. Our kids 
only get one shot at a decent education. They cannot afford to wait any longer . . . So 
starting today, we’ll be giving states more flexibility to meet high standards. Keep in 
mind, the change we’re making is not lowering standards; we’re saying we’re going to 
give you more flexibility to meet high standards.”). 
 77  Michael A. Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 71–72 (2012); see also Letter from Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y 
of Educ., to Hon. John Kline, Chairman, Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, U.S. House 
of Representatives (July 6, 2011) (stating to Representative Kline that the Secretary 
would “waive most statutory and regulatory requirements if needed”); see also Sam Dil-
lon, Obama to Waive Parts of No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES  (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/education-/23educ.html?_r=0 (“[U]nder the plan 
outlined by the White House, Secretary of Education Duncan would allow states that 
agree to overhaul low-performing schools and adopt more rigorous teacher evaluation 
systems to apply for relief from the Bush-era law’s 2014 deadline and other unpopular 
provisions. States that qualify for the waivers would be allowed to design their own 
school accountability systems.”). 
 78  Winnie Hu, 10 States Are Given Waivers From Education Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/education/10-states-given-waivers-
from-no-child-left-behind-law.html?ref=nochildleftbehindact (detailing that Secretary 
Duncan said the states, including New Jersey, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Georgia, 
Florida, Kentucky, Indiana, Colorado, Minnesota, and Oklahoma, “had agreed to adopt 
standards for college and career readiness; implement new accountability systems with 
more flexibility in assessing student achievement; and develop evaluation and support 
systems based on measures to improve teacher effectiveness.”).  
 79  Richard Perez-Pena, Waivers for 8 More States From “No Child Left Behind,” 
N.Y. TIMES  (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/education/eight-more-
states-get-waiver-from-no-child-law.html?ref=nochildleftbehindact&_r=0 (specifying 
the states included: Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and Rhode Island).  
 80  Motoko Rich, 5 More States Get Waivers From Education Law Rules, N.Y. 
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administration has issued waivers to “more than half the 
nation’s states freeing them from central provisions of the 
law, raising the question of whether the decade-old federal 
program has been essentially nullified.”81 By September of 
2013, 41 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 districts in 
California had been granted NCLB “flexibility waivers” by the 
U.S. Department of Education.82 
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY VERSUS PRACTICALITY 
Under Section 9401 of the ESEA, “the Secretary [of 
Education] may waive any statutory or regulatory requirement 
of this chapter for a State educational agency, local educational 
agency, Indian tribe, or school through a local educational 
agency, that (1) receives funds under a program authorized by 
this chapter; and (2) requests a waiver under subsection (b) of 
this section.”83 While it is evident that broad, discretionary 
power is given to the Secretary of Education to issue waivers to 
any requirement,84 the Secretary does not have the authority 
under Section 9401 to impose new conditions on school 
districts. Many argue that Section 9401 does not expressly 
forbid voluntary conditions on waivers and that accepting such 
conditional waivers has been common practice.85 Yet when 
 
TIMES (June 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/education/5-more-states-
get-waivers-from-education-law-rules.html?ref=nochildleftbehindact (noting that “Fri-
day’s action by the administration brings to a total of 24 the number of states that have 
received waivers, and applications from an additional 13 states are under review.”). 
 81  No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 6.  
 82  Michele McNeil, NCLB Waiver-Renewal Process Turns Up Heat on States, 
EDUC. WEEK (Sep. 10, 2013), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/09/11/03waiver_ep.h33.html?qs=nclb+waivers
+issued+in+2013 (“Thirty-five of those waivers were approved in the first two rounds, 
which means their flexibility expires at the end of the 2013–14 school year. Those 35 
will be the first to go through the renewal process.”). 
 83  20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2011); see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 84  See BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 12 (noting that the Secretary’s discre-
tionary authority was affirmed when a federal court rejected a state’s challenge to a 
denial of its waiver request in State of Connecticut v. Spellings); see also State of Con-
necticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 495 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d as modified sub 
nom. Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1471 
(2011) (stating that “[T]he language of the provision governing waivers grants the Sec-
retary broad discretion to deny states’ waiver requests.”); see, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon 
Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
 85  Brown & Ayers, supra note 2; see BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 4 (there 
has not been a legal challenge to the Secretary’s broad and extensive waiver authority 
in federal court). 
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waivers are dependent on states accepting the Obama 
administration’s education policies,86 the Secretary is imposing 
the federal education policy agenda on states, which is not 
permitted under Section 9401 of the ESEA.87 
Conditional waivers raise serious questions of 
constitutionality as well. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
empowers Congress “to make all laws which shall be necessary 
and proper.”88 When states and school districts are required to 
implement the Obama administration’s education policies to 
receive waiver approval, Article I is violated. President Obama 
effectively enacts federal education policy through conditional 
waivers without the input of, or legislation passed by, both 
Houses of Congress the Constitution requires.89 However, when 
there is no prospect of legislation passing Congress in a divided 
political climate, what option does the President have but to act 
to create some makeshift federal education policy? The NCLB 
Act was up for reauthorization in 2007, yet no cohesive 
legislation has been passed to correct its weaknesses and states 
repeatedly fail to make adequate yearly progress as required to 
avoid sanctions.90 
Despite real-world practicality concerns over the 
continuation of the NCLB provisions, the unconstitutionality of 
implementing education policy through conditional waivers 
remains paramount. Although President Obama faces a 
politically divided Congress with little desire to compromise, 
the ability to pass legislation is Congress’ authority alone 
 
 86  Hu, supra note 78; see also Perez-Pena, supra note 79 (specifying that the 
waivers were granted “in exchange for an agreement by states to meet new standards, 
in a longer time frame, that Arne Duncan, the education secretary, says are tougher”); 
Rich, supra note 80 (reporting these states agreed “to enact new standards and evalu-
ate schools and teachers based on students’ academic progress” in accordance with 
President Obama’s education policy agenda). 
 87  See BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 6 (while the Secretary is not explicitly 
requiring the conditions, the reality is that a waiver’s approval is dependent on the 
state acquiescing to new conditions).  
 88  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 89  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, 3 (These provisions are the primary justifications 
for unilateral action by the executive); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (rul-
ing that where the House takes actions that have the purpose and effect of altering le-
gal rights, duties, or relations of persons outside of the legislative branch, bicameral-
ism and presentment are required). 
 90  See Brown & Ayers, supra note 2 (stating that NCLB has been operating on 
“auto-pilot” since 2007); see also Kenny, supra note 8 (noting that during the 2010–
2011 school year, almost half of all public schools in the country failed to meet the edu-
cational goals based on the NCLB ratings system goals). 
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under Article I of the Constitution.91 While a comprehensive 
policy to improve our public schools is long overdo, conditional 
waivers that circumvent the legislative process and put a band-
aid on a continuously bleeding system are not the answer. 
Conditional waivers lack comprehensive education policy 
provisions, set a dangerous precedent for future legislation, 
and undermine the legislative process central to our 
democracy.92 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is evident that America’s education system needs saving. 
A comprehensive education bill that respects the legislative 
process and our constitutional foundation is the solution. This 
idea may seem optimistic, unrealistic, or even delusional, as 
partisan politics are so strongly embedded in Congress that 
compromise seems a mere fantasy of another era. So, we allow 
President Obama to evade the political divide in Congress 
through executive action, as he tells us, “[w]e can’t wait for an 
increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they 
won’t act, I will.”93 Yet, unilateral executive action that 
undermines the Constitution must be analyzed under a 
rigorous standard, for more is at stake than merely the issues 
being addressed. The issuance of conditional waivers 
challenges the legitimacy of government decision-making and 
adherence to our constitutional order. 
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 91  Id. (arguing that “[t]o refuse to pass any piece of legislation is as much a 
function of legislative power as to pass it.”). 
 92  Id. (noting President Obama’s actions in bypassing the legislative process 
and using executive action to “prevent drug shortages, raise fuel-efficiency standards, 
and cut refinancing fees for federally insured mortgages”); see also Marc Tucker, The 
Feds’ Education Power Grab, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/-jan/24/opinion/la-oe-tucker-nationalization-of-
education-20130124 (“The denial is disturbing for what it reveals: namely, that the 
American education system is being reshaped in a truly fundamental way, and with 
little debate.”). 
 93  President Barack Obama, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Ameri-
can Jobs Act (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/jobsact; but see Ken-
ny, supra note 8 (arguing that “the refusal of either house to pass the president’s agen-
da hardly makes the Congress ‘dysfunctional.’”). 
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